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dent judgment creditors. The opinion stated, "The courts of this
State are not wholly without power to protect a resident creditor
at least so far as the relief to be secured relates to property within
the jurisdiction of the court and unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor." '  The court concluded that such a statutory
garnishment was not a violation of the "administration" of the
trust.9
The dissent, by Judge Desm'ond, pointed out that the court
was subjecting the trustees to two conflicting sets of instructions,
by two different courts. New York courts were making a direction
for payment of income contrary to the terms of the trust itself
and the directions of the court administering the trust.
In the instant case there was no question raised as to the
validity of the trust, the beneficiary's being alive, or the amount of
income due to him. The New York court was merely attempting
to reach what was admittedly due to defendant from property
within the state, by statutory garnishment.'0 Irrespective of
whether this may be said to be technically within the province of
"administration" of a trust," the jurisdiction whose law governs
administration should not be heard to complain. The instant case
was just another example of the fundamental principle that every
state has jurisdiction to determine for itself the liability of prop-
erty located within its territorial limits, especially where it is to
be. applied to the satisfaction of a judgment obtained in this state
by a resident creditor."2
Statute of Frauds
Whether compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a matter
of procedure or evidence to be ruled by the lex fori, or a matter
of the substantive validity of a transaction, normally governed by
the law of the place of occurrence, has long been the subject of
8. Supra note 4 at 315, 113 N. E. 2d at 437; see Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y.
381, 388-289, 187 N. E. 65, 68 (1933) ; Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N. Y. 70, 78, 86 N. E.
828, 831 (1909).
9. A consideration of the remaining issue in the case, compliance -with the New
York garnishment statute, resulted in the conclusion that the conditions of the statute
were fulfilled.
10. If a somewhat analogous situation arose before judgment under the attach-
ment statute, it is very probable that jurisdiction would be assumed, since the Court
of Appeals has stated that the attachment and garnishment statutes must be read to-
gether, in pari materia. See Morris Plan Ind. Bank v. Gunning, 295 N. Y. 324, 331, 67
N. E. 2d 510, 513 (1946) ; cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Young, 258 App. Div. 323,
16 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (4th Dep't 1939).
11. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1024 (1935), states that the power of the bene-
ficiary's creditors to reach the trust res or its income is a question of administration.
12. Accord, Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't
1902) ; see Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 213 (1935) ; Disconto Gesellschaft v. Urn-
breit, 208 U. S. 570, 580 (1908).
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controversy.13 The problem arises most frequently where an oral
contract is involved, valid and enforceable where made, but viola-
tive of the forum's Statute of Frauds if the latter is held to apply.
The substantive or procedural characterization of the statute by
the forum in accordance with its own conflict of laws principles 14
is of vital importance since, for all practical purposes, it will deter-
mine the final disposition of such a case. Curiously, the Court
of Appeals has never met the issue squarely, although it has recog-
nized the existence of the problem. 15
In Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,16 the court, invoking a sort of
judicial conservation of energy, again expressly refrained from
generally characterizing the Statute of Frauds. The issue arose
in a suit for specific performance of an oral contract between
the defendant's testator, a New York domiciliary, and the plaintiff,
in which the testator promised not to change his will without the
plaintiff's consent and the latter promised to purchase certain
shares in a family corporation (which he had done). The oral
contract was concededly valid in Florida, where it was made, but
unenforceable if the New York Statute of Frauds were applied.
The denial of defendant's motions for summary judgment in Spe-
cial Term17 was reversed by the Appellate Division,' and judg-
ment was directed for the defendant.
Affirming, the Court of Appeals specifically emphasized that
it was not here concerned with a typical Statute of Frauds prob-
lem as related to a commercial contract, but with a contract in
which the state had a greater than ordinary interest. It was ini-
tially assumed that, for the purpose of the New York Statute of
Frauds, there was no difference between a contract "to bequeath
p.roperty or make a testamentary provision' ' and a contract
to refrain from changing an existing will. Judge Conway reasoned
that the result in this case would be the same, regardless of the
characterization of the statute. Were the statute held to be. pro-
cedural, the law of the forum would apply and the oral contract
13. See Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L. 3.
311 (1923), for an excellent analysis of the problem,'resulting in the author's preference
for the view that the statute is substantive: 1 Bi.o. I.. REv. 340 (1952).
14. GOODRICH, Co.,FLitt oF LAws § 81 (3d ed. 1949).
15. See Russell v. Societe Anonyme des Etablissements Aeroxon, 268 N. Y. 173,
180-181, 197 N. E. 185, 187-188 (1935); Franklin Su*gar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, 247
N. Y. 465, 469-471, 160 K. E. 916, 917-918 (1928) ; Reilly v. Steinhart, 217 N. Y. 549,
553, 112 N. E. 468, 469 (1916).
16. 305 N. Y. 288, 113 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
17. 107 N. Y. S. 2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
18. 280 App. Div. 348, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (1st Dep't 1952).
19. "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void. unless it or some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged there-
with, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking; . .. 7. Is a
contract to bequeath property or make a testamentary provision of any kind." N. Y.
PEis. PROP. LAW § 31 (7).
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would not be enforced. If determined to be substantive, the New
York law would still be applied, based on the principle that the
lex loci will be disregarded where contrary to a strong public
policy of the forum. 0
In the absence of an expression of a contrary intent, the law
of the testator's last domicile is the law of the will, at least as far
as personalty is concerned. An oral agreement which affects the
terms of a will, such as the one in issue, interferes with an orderly
devolution of the testator's estate under the will, and subverts the
stringent requirements which the state of domicile has established
for making agreements of a testamentary character. The final
domicile, being vitally interested in the privilege of testamenta-
tion, which it has granted, and in preserving the estates of its
domiciliaries, over which its courts have assumed jurisdiction, "is
more concerned in the policy to be insisted on than any other
jurisdiction, and justifies it in framing its rules accordingly. -1
Since, in the instant case, the forum was also the promisor's domi-
cile, its policy, as expressed in Personal Property Law § 31 (7),
was applied, thus preventing the enforcement of the oral agree-
ment.
The court reinforced this reasoning by arriving at the same
result through the application of a different choice of law rule,
the "center of gravity theory," sometimes called accumulation of
contact points. Under this rule the controlling law is that of the
state in which are grouped the greatest number of significant
elements relating to the matter in dispute. By the application of
this test, New York law would govern the oral contract, since the
instant case involved a claim against an estate administered under
the supervision of a New York court, the basis of which was a
promise by a New York domiciliary not to alter a will governed
by New York law. Apparently, Florida's only contact was the fact
that it was the place where the contract was made.
Judge Desmond concurred, but thought the court should have
extended its decision by holding the Statute of Frauds to be pro-
cedural and evidentiary.
The Rubin case appears to be of limited precedent value. The
court expressly refrained from determining the characterization
of the Statute of Frauds as applied to an ordinary or commercial
contract.2 Nor did it decide that Personal Property Law § 31 (7)
proclaims a local policy so strong that it must be applied every
20. See Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 414, 173 N. E.
564, 567 (1930).
21. Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 329, 39 N. E. 1026, 1027 (1895).
22. However, we do have a fairly clear indication of how at least one judge
would decide.
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time the facts of a case litigated in the New York courts fall within
the section. Of great importance was the fact that the instantdispute affected the testamentary dispositions of a New York domi-
ciliary. Because of the dominant interest which New York has inthis matter, a strong protective policy appears justified. It should
be remembered, however, that public policy should not be the soleground for deciding a conflict of laws problem, except in a clear
case.2 That the court considered the instant case to be a clear one,
there is no doubt; but it may be questioned whether New York, theforum, would have invoked the public policy argument had it not
been simultaneously the domicile.
Marriage
Should a marriage, valid where celebrated but void were it
performed in the parties' domicile, be recognized in the latter state IThe generally recognized rule is that a marriage which is valid
at the place of celebration is valid everywhere.24  There are, how-
ever, two broadly stated exceptions to this rule :5 the first includes
marriages which are contrary to natural law as it is generally
regarded in Christian countries,2 6 and the second includes mar-
riages which the legislature of the forum has declared to be in-
valid because violative of some particularly strong local policy.27
The latter exception has caused some difficulty, since courts differ
on the question of whether a particular prohibition is such a strong
expression of local policy that a marriage must be declared invalid
regardless of the place where it was contracted. 2 8
23. "Local policy should not . . . be an instnmentalitv for rationalization of
refusal to give effect to the law of another state, unless there is some exceptional and
unusually sound reason." STUMMERG, CONFLICT oF LAws 146 n. 47 (2d ed. 1951); seeLorenzen, supra note 13. at 337.
24. 2 BEALF, op. cit. siipra note 11, at 669.25. In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428 (1927) ; GooDRicH, op. cit.
supra note 14. § 116.26. To bring it within the meaning of this exception, the marriage must beeither incestuous (between persons in the direct line of consanguinity or betweenbrother and sister) or polygamous. In re Miller's -Estate, supra note 25 at 457, 214N. W. at 429.27. STUMERG, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 232. It may be noted that the secondexception coincides, for all practical purposes, with the conflicts rule prevailing in some
states requiring compliance with the law of the domiciliary state for the validation
of a marriage, regardless of the law of the place of the marriage.28. "A marriage which is prohibited here by statute, because contrary to thepolicy of our laws, is yet valid if celebrated elsewhere according to the law of theplace, even if the parties are citizens and residents of this Commonwealth, and havegone abroad for the purpose of evading our laws, unless the Legislature has clearlyenacted that such marriages out of the state shall have no validity here." Commonwealth
v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 464, 18 Am. Rep. 509, 514-515 (1873). But cf. In re Stull'sEstate, 183 Pa. 625, 632-633, 39 Atl. 16, 18 (1898), in which it was said that a marriageis invalid where it offends the prevailing sense of good morals of the domiciliary
state and there was an intention to evade the positive law of the domicile.
